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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In terms of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal,
1
 one of the requirements of a fair dismissal 
for misconduct is that the sanction imposed must be ‗appropriate‘.
2
 Whilst the Code does not 
carry the weight of law, the Labour Relations Act 55 of 1996 (LRA) which regulates unfair 
dismissals, explicitly states that the Code must be taken into account. With regard to the 
‗appropriateness of sanction‘, this requirement does not stand alone but is supplemented by 
other, equally important considerations such as the validity of the workplace rule
3
 that was 
breached and the consistency
4
 in which it has been applied in the past.  
The consideration of the ‗appropriateness of sanction‘ has led to a plethora of case law which 
seeks to define this term. The South African courts have grappled with the determination of a 
definitive test to determine the appropriateness of sanction. In the past, our courts have relied 
upon legal tests from foreign jurisdictions along with the incumbent flaws that may 
accompany it. A difficulty arises however with applying foreign law to a domestic legal 
framework, which is characterised by significantly different considerations when dealing 
with dismissals for misconduct.  
The English ‗reasonable employer‘
5
 test, adopted by the Industrial Court to determine the 
appropriateness of sanction, was later rejected as a ‗palpable mistake‘
6
 and no longer 
applicable to South African law.
7
 Subsequently, a modified version of the reasonable 
employer test (herein referred to as the ‗deferential approach‘) was relied upon by the South 
African courts to determine the appropriateness of sanction. This approach too was rejected 
as being unduly deferential to employers. The ‗reasonable commissioner‘ test as developed 
by the Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
8
 Constitutional 
Court judgment is not free from its fair share of criticism. The practical implementation of the 
                                                          
1
 Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), hereafter the ‗Code‘. 
2
 Item 7 (b) (iv) of the Code. 
3
 Item 7 (b) (i) of the Code. 
4
 Item 7 (b) (iii) of the Code. 
5
 The ‗reasonable employer test‘ as derived from English law. 
6
 See Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC). 
7
 J Myburgh & A Van Niekerk ‗Dismissal as a Penalty for Misconduct: The Reasonable Employer and Other 
Approaches‘ (2000) 21 ILJ 2145, 2145. Author states that ‗a distinction was drawn between the concepts of 
reasonableness and fairness, and it was considered that the application of a test of reasonableness limited the 
discretion of the Industrial Court to determine alleged unfair labour practices‘. 
8
 Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC). 
13 
 
test and whether it satisfies its objectives of meting out fairness (namely to balance the 
interests of the employer and employee) are controversial. It is debateable whether the 
reformed test satisfies the Constitutional imperative of fairness
9
 in light of its potential to be 
excessively deferential to commissioners. 
1.1. RATIONALE, OBJECTIVES OF THIS DISSERTATION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
The rationale behind this research paper is to determine the meaning of an ‗appropriate‘ 
sanction for misconduct.  It will consider the legal tests the courts have used in the past, as 
well as consider the various factors the courts take into account when applying the test as it 
currently stands. As the tests adopted by our courts in establishing the fairness of a sanction 
have been developed and reformed in recent years; it is important to clarify the current, 
applicable legal principles and tests as well as to evaluate the merits of these recent 
developments.  
The objective of this paper is to establish clarity regarding this newly reformed area of law 
and to make recommendations to combat any inherent deficiencies that may be identified 
during the course of this research.  
The aim of this paper is to clarify the legal standard against which the appropriateness of 
dismissals for misconduct is measured. Bearing in mind that South Africa had initially 
adopted the legal test for the ‗appropriateness of sanction‘ from English law, there will be 
consideration of: the deficiencies in the English ‗reasonable employer‘ test, some of the 
issues our legal system inherited when we embraced a similar approach to sanction and why 
this approach was ultimately rejected by the Constitutional Court. 
This research paper will also attempt to trace recent developments in this area of law by 
considering the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ approach in determining the appropriateness of a 
dismissal for misconduct and the rationale behind adopting such an approach. Most 
importantly an evaluation will be undertaken of whether the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ test 
satisfies the legislative requirement of fairness and sufficiently balances the rights of the 
employer and the employee. 
                                                          
9
 See section 23 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. 
14 
 
There will also be contemplation of how the test for the appropriateness of sanction can be 
modified to promote equity for both employer and employee. In so doing, there will be 
consideration of the factors laid down in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals and the 
CCMA Guidelines
10
 to assist commissioners in adopting a balanced approach to dismissals 
for misconduct. These factors including progressive discipline, the relationship of trust and 
tolerability will be considered and interpreted. 
1.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution ensures that every person is entitled to ‗fair labour practices‘
11
 as a 
fundamental human right. The LRA, which is the primary mechanism for regulating 
employment matters in South Africa, explicitly states that ‗every employee has the right not 
to be unfairly dismissed and subjected to unfair labour practices‘.
12
 Therefore this research 
paper will be conducted in light of the notion of ‗fairness‘ as enunciated by the Constitution 
and the LRA;
13
 which permeates the enquiry into the appropriateness of sanction. This 
research will be based on legislation and case law analysis; literature from textbooks and 
journal articles will also be relied upon to consolidate research in this area of law. 
1.3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The origin of the employment contract can be traced back to Roman law. In terms of Roman 
law, a distinction was made between the letting of one‘s physical property known as location 
conduction rei and the hiring of one‘s personal services known as locatio conduction 
operum.
14
 However it was only after the Industrial Revolution that the contract of 
employment became readily utilised and developed into what it is today.
15
 
The South African legal system originally viewed the employment relationship as solely 
contractual.
16
 In terms of the common law of South Africa, the employer could dismiss the 
employee on the basis of employee misconduct, even if the misconduct was not serious, by 
merely giving the employee the required notice. If the misconduct was sufficiently serious 
                                                          
10
 CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations Notice 602 of 2011. 
11
 Section 23 (1) of the Constitution. 
12
 Section 185 of the LRA. 
13
 The LRA is supplemented by the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals and the CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct 
Arbitrations Notice 602 of 2011. Published by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(herein the CCMA) in terms of section 115 (2) (g) of the LRA, to become effective of 1 January 2012. 
14
 A Basson, P.A.K Le Roux & E.M.L Strydom Essential Labour Law 5
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ed (2007) 6. 
15 
 
enough, the employer could summarily dismiss the employee; that is dismiss the employee 
without notice.
17
 Dismissal was not the only sanction available to the employer; he could 
impose other sanctions such as suspensions insofar as his actions did not amount to a breach 
of contract (unlawful conduct). In practice the employer was not limited to the penalties 
provided for in the contract of employment and through his stronger bargaining power and 
the right to lawfully dismiss on notice, the employer could in fact treat the employee unfairly 
as long as this did not breach the terms of the employment contract.
18
 
Therefore the common law was primarily concerned with unlawful as opposed to unfair 
dismissals.  In 1979 a newly created Industrial Court was empowered to determine disputes 
concerning ‗unfair labour practices‘. The Industrial Court and the Labour Appeal Court
19
 
used the concept of unfair labour practices as a means of developing new principles in the 
‗individual employment relationship‘.
20
 In the 1980‘s the courts finally accepted that 
dismissals could constitute an unfair labour practice in terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 
of 1956 and consequently accepted that a lawful dismissal could also be rendered unfair.
21
  
The development by the Labour Courts under the previous Act of the notion of an unfair 
dismissal has been cemented in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 which prohibits the 
unfair dismissal of an employee.
22
 While the right not to be unlawfully dismissed is protected 
by contractual law, this right does not automatically incorporate the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed in terms of the LRA, however, ‗the courts have accepted that an unlawful dismissal 
will seldom, if ever, be fair‘.
23
 
1.4. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION AND GUIDELINES  
The right to fair labour practices has now been entrenched in the 1996 Constitution
24
 and the 
following Acts promulgated to give effect to it; the LRA, the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
25
 
                                                          
17
 See the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. Section 37(6) (b) deals with the right of the 
employer to dismiss the employee for any cause recognised by law without prior notice. 
18
 Basson, Le Roux & Strydom op cit note 14 at 113. 
19
 The Labour Appeal Court was established in 1988. 
20
 Grogan op cit note 16 at 6 & 7. 
21
 Ibid. Author referring to Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v The President of the Industrial Court and 
Others (1986) 7 ILJ 152 (T). 
22
 Section 185 of the LRA. 
23
 Grogan op cit note 16 at 216. 
24
 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
16 
 
In terms of section 188 (1) of the LRA a dismissal is unfair if it is not effected for a ‗fair 
reason‘ and in accordance with a ‗fair procedure‘, even if it complies with any notice period 
in a contract of employment or in legislation governing employment. In addition whether or 
not a dismissal is for a fair reason is determined by the ‗facts of each case and the 
appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty‘.
26
 What can be concluded is that all dismissals are 
measured against the benchmark of fairness as articulated in the LRA. It is of importance to 
note that the provisions of the LRA in regulating dismissals are supplemented by both the 
Code and the recently enacted CCMA Guidelines.  
The relevant guidelines in the Code
27
 state that: 
 ‗Any person who is determining whether a dismissal for misconduct is unfair should 
consider - 
a) whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating conduct in, or of 
relevance to, the workplace; and 
b) if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not – 
i) the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
ii) the employee was aware or could reasonably be expected to have been aware, of the rule 
or standard; 
iii) the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; and 
iv) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the rule or standard.‘ 
As mentioned above, the test is one of fairness but in arriving at a determination of what is 
fair and what is not, it is imperative that the various elements of this test are carefully 
examined. In terms of factors (i – iii) above, there has been numerous examples of case law 
that succinctly interprets these provisions and their significance. In terms of factor (iv) 
however, there has been inconsistent judgments regarding the determination of the 
appropriateness of the sanction and the correct legal tests to be applied. This in turn has 
resulted in the lay person being denied clarity on what are the legal standards to be satisfied 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
25
 Grogan op cit note 16 at 8. 
26
 Item 2 of the Code. 
27
 Item 7 (1) of the Code. 
17 
 
when contemplating a dismissal as a sanction for misconduct. Furthermore the judiciary has 
failed to hand down consistent judgments due to the lack of consistent precedent surrounding 
this area of law. It seems that the crux of the matter lies in the interpretation and development 
of the test for the ‗appropriateness‘ of sanction; bearing in mind that while it is an objective 
enquiry, it may yield contrasting subjective responses.  
According to the CCMA Guidelines:  
‗The test is whether the employer could fairly have imposed the sanction of dismissal in the 
circumstances, either because the misconduct on its own rendered the continued employment 
relationship intolerable, or because of the cumulative effect of the misconduct when taken 
together with other instances of misconduct.‘
28
  
The CCMA Guidelines, in considering various types of employee misconduct that may 
justify dismissal, found it necessary to include instances of serious once - off offences as well 
as instances of repeated offences. The Guidelines goes one step further to specifically list 
these types of serious offences that may render a dismissal justified.  
The CCMA Guidelines also state that:  
‗The arbitrator must make a value judgement as to the fairness of the employer‘s decision, 
taking into account all relevant circumstances. This must be a balanced and equitable 
assessment taking into account the interests of both the employer and employee. In making 
this assessment, the arbitrator must give serious consideration to, and seek to understand the 
rationale for, the employer‘s rules and standards.‘
29
  
The role of the arbitrator as contemplated in the CCMA Guidelines is derived from the legal 
principles pronounced in recent case law.
30
 Consequently in order to fully understand how the 
arbitrator is to exercise his or her ‗value judgment‘, regard must be had to the approach of the 
courts in such matters. 
It has been contended that there are various situations where the determination of ‗what may 
constitute an appropriate sanction may be relatively easy‘
31
 but there are situations where one 
                                                          
28
 Paragraph 93 of the CCMA Guidelines (‗Guidelines‘). 
29
 Paragraph 93 of the Guidelines.  
30
 Supra note 8. 
31
 P.A.K Le Roux ‗Dismissals for Misconduct: Some Reflections‘ (2004) 25 ILJ 868, 873. 
18 
 
person‘s perspective on fairness differs significantly to that of another.
32
 The inquiry into the 
general fairness of the dismissal requires a value judgment on the part of the commissioner, 
which in essence incorporates a range of responses to the appropriateness of the imposition of 
























CHAPTER 2:  
THE UNITED KINGDOM ‘REASONABLE EMPLOYER’ TEST 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the ‗reasonable employer test‘ which has been used to 
determine the appropriateness of sanction. The enquiry looks at the perspective of the 
reasonable employer and incorporates a hypothetical and objective test in determining the 
fairness of the dismissal. This test was developed in the United Kingdom; however, the 
‗reasonable employer‘ approach was adapted and applied by South African courts in the past. 
A further objective in this chapter is to evaluate the flaws of this approach as evident from 
English case law.  
The inquiry into the appropriateness of sanction has often initiated a debate into when an 
arbitrator may intervene and interfere with the decision of the employer to dismiss. This is an 
issue that has not only dominated South African jurisprudence but English case law as well.  
Le Roux points out the crux of this controversial debate with reference to opposing 
viewpoints on the matter: 
‗Supporters of some form of deference to managerial decisions in this regard point out that, in 
the absence of bias on the part of the employer, there is no good reason why the value 
judgement of a third party as to whether the dismissal is justified should override the value 
judgement of a manager who knows and understands the needs and circumstances of the 
employer‘s business or organization. Detractors point out that too great a deference to 









 judgements of Sidumo which have ultimately brought South African 
jurisprudence to its current position. Before an analysis of South African case law can be 
undertaken, it is of necessity to briefly examine the origins of the ‗reasonable employer‘ test. 
 
 




 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA). 
35
 Supra note 8. 
20 
 
2.1. Origin of the ‘reasonable employer’ test 
In terms of English law, unfair dismissals are regulated by statute. The Employment Rights 
Act 1996, section 98 (1) states that: 
‗In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or 
unfair, it is for the employer to show—  
(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and  
(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a 
kind such as to justify [emphasis added] the dismissal of an employee holding the position 
which the employee held. 
(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it—  
(a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind 
which he was employed by the employer to do,  
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee,  
(c) is that the employee was redundant, or  
(d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without 
contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed 
by or under an enactment.‘ 
Section 98 (4) of the Act states that:  
‗In any other case where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), 
the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair... 
 (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources 
of the employer‘s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably [emphasis 
added] in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and  
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.‘ 
Although South African law derives much of its substance from English law, it is important 
to be aware of the fact that the requirements set forth in the United Kingdom Employment 
Act, although dealing with the fairness of the dismissal, are primarily engaged with the 
concepts of ‗justification‘ and ‗reasonableness‘. There is no supplementary requirement 
specifically relating to the appropriateness of the sanction, as we have within our Code of 
21 
 
Good Practice. It is nevertheless relevant to consider the English ‗reasonable employer‘ test, 
which has been modified and applied by South African courts in the past. 
The ‗reasonable employer‘ test can be traced back to the House of Lords in 1981. British 
Leyland (U.K) Ltd v B.J. Swift
36
 is authority for the following legal propositions: the test is 
not in fact whether a reasonable employer would consider a lesser penalty appropriate but 
rather, ‗was it reasonable for the employer to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would 
have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might 
reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair‘. 
The court went on to state that ‗in all cases there is a band of reasonableness within which 




In applying the ‗reasonable employer‘ test, the decision of a specific employer to dismiss is 
compared to the objective standard of a reasonable employer. The test does not evaluate the 
possibility of substituting the sanction for a more suitable one but rather focuses on 
reasonableness of the employer‘s specific decision to dismiss.   
Brodtkorb states that there is a great deal of criticism regarding the ‗range of reasonable 
responses‘ approach but ‗a unifying theme is the concern that it gives too much discretion to 
employers and as a result unfair dismissal law offers too little protection for employees.
38
 
In considering exclusively the point of view of the employer and equating the employer‘s 
idea of reasonableness with that of fairness; the courts have developed an excessively 
deferential approach towards the employer in the assessment of an appropriate sanction. The 
‗range of reasonable responses‘ approach has been criticised for failing to adequately 
consider section 98 (4) (b) of the Act which refers to the ‗equity and substantial merits of the 
case‘. It has been argued that the ‗range of reasonable responses‘ approach, by deferring to 
employer discretion, ‗deprives industrial tribunals of the opportunity to curb management 
prerogative and fully consider the interests of employees or the public‘.
39
 It is distressing that 
the approach makes no reference to the perspective of the employee. This is essentially 
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destructive of the concept of fairness; which summons the balancing of competing interests 
of the employer and employee. 
The test has also been condemned for distorting the statutory test for fairness, in terms of the 
reasonableness of the employer‘s decision, with a negative formula of whether the 
employer‘s conduct is unreasonable.
40
 Brodtkorb contends that ‗where the dismissal is neither 
clearly unreasonable nor clearly reasonable, if one asks if it is reasonable, one is more likely 
to get a negative reply than if one asks if it is unreasonable‘.
41
  
It has also been argued that the ‗range of reasonable responses‘ approach requires a tribunal 
to consider the range of responses open to an employer when faced with a particular form of 
workplace misconduct. This range of responses incorporates ‗mild to harsh‘
42
 responses, all 
of which may be deemed fair. The consequence is that there is potential for a dismissal to be 
‗harsh but fair‘.
43
 As a result, the concept of a ‗band of reasonableness‘ provides an employer 
with ample scope for justifying his decision to dismiss as being fair despite its failure to take 
into account the harsh consequences it may have for the employee. 
In Mr AJ Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd,
44
 it was held that: 
‗It is likely however that what the tribunals would have done will often coincide with their 
judgement as to what a reasonable employer would have done...The task of the tribunal is to 
pronounce judgement on the reasonableness of the employers‘ actions and whenever they 
uphold an employee‘s complaint they are in effect ―substituting their own judgement for that 
of the employer‖. Providing they apply the test of reasonableness, it is their duty both to 
determine their own judgment and to substitute it where appropriate.‘ 
It is not difficult to appreciate why this judgment was later overruled in Foley v Post Office,
45
 
as in exclusively considering the employer‘s perspective, the court failed to adequately 
consider all relevant circumstances.  The arbitrator‘s role is not to substitute his own 
judgement for that of the employer, but to place himself in the position of the employer only 
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in an effort to obtain a clearer understanding of the employer‘s point of view. Furthermore an 
arbitrator cannot plausibly argue that he is able to understand the particular employer‘s 
business operations better than the employer himself, thus a measure of deference is 
necessary. Arbitrators may be skilled in legal reasoning and the interpretation of law but with 
regard to certain aspects of trade or specialised business, an arbitrator has no real choice but 
to rely on the special knowledge of the employer. 
It seems that for a tribunal ‗to substitute its own judgment‘, as referred to in AJ Haddon,
46
 the 
court may have usurped the authority of an employer to impose the sanction he deems fit and 
has extended its authority beyond the simple question of whether the dismissal was fair. In 
this particular instance, an excessively deferential approach to the opinion of the arbitrator, 
which does not attempt to balance the interests of the employer and employee, illustrates the 
dangers of arbitrators misinterpreting their functions and authority in the determination of an 
appropriate sanction. 
The court in AJ Haddon went on to criticize the ‗band of reasonableness‘ approach advocated 
in the British Leyland.
47
  The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that ‗dismissal is an ultimate 
sanction. There is, in reality, no range or band to be considered, only whether the employer 
acted reasonably in invoking that sanction‘. Furthermore the court in AJ Haddon held that, 
‗[t]he mantra ―the band or range of reasonable responses‖ is not helpful because it had led 
tribunals into applying what amounts to a perversity test‘.
48
 
In Foley v Post Office
49
 the court rejected and overruled the findings in AJ Haddon and found 
that it was made clear in the Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones
50
 that the provisions of section 
98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 ‗did not require such a high degree of 
unreasonableness to be shown or that nothing short of a perverse decision to dismiss can be 
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held to be fair‘.
51
 The court stated that the tribunals had been advised to follow the 
formulation of the ‗band of reasonable responses‘:  
‗The range of responses approach is not rendered perverse or unhelpful by the fact that there 
are extremes. In between those extremes there will be cases where there is room for 
reasonable disagreement among reasonable employers as to whether dismissal for the 
particular misconduct is a reasonable or unreasonable response.‘ 
This judgement is in accordance with British Leyland
52
 which advocates that an arbitrator‘s 
idea of reasonableness and the employer‘s idea of reasonableness may be different but as 
different as they may be, each may be deemed reasonable and fair in its own right. 
The court in Foley
53
 went on further to state that in determining the fairness of the sanction: 
‗[T]he process must always be conducted by reference to the objective standards of the 
hypothetical reasonable employer which are imported by the statutory reference to 
―reasonably or unreasonably‖ and not by reference to the subjective views of arbitrators and 
what they would in fact have done as an employer in the same circumstances.‘ 
By substituting their own judgments for that of the employer, it has been contended that 
‗whenever a tribunal finds a dismissal to be unfair, they are in effect substituting their own 
judgment for that of the employer‘
54
 and thus a tribunal may misinterpret the prohibition and 




What can be concluded from the above cases is that the English law concept of fairness, in 
terms of sanction, equates the employer‘s and tribunal‘s viewpoint of what is reasonable to 
what is appropriate and fair. Furthermore the ‗band of reasonableness‘,
56
 while allowing the 
employer to maintain his managerial prerogative and the freedom to impose workplace rules 
and standards, will in effect, very seldom render the employer‘s decision to dismiss unfair on 
the grounds of ‗unreasonableness‘.  
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In failing to balance the competing interests of both the employer and the employee, the 
reasonable employer test amounts to an excessively deferential approach to the employer‘s 
‗say so‘, with tribunals rubber stamping an employer‘s decision on the basis that it is not 
patently unreasonable. By disregarding the employee‘s perspective it firstly undermines the 
balancing of competing interests associated with the concept of fairness and it secondly fails 
to provide an adequate constraint on the employer‘s managerial prerogative to impose a 


























THE SOUTH AFRICAN ‘DEFERENTIAL APPROACH’ TO SANCTION 
 
The previous chapter has highlighted the problems that can be associated with the English 
‗reasonable employer‘ test. This chapter endeavours to evaluate the effect of adopting a 
similar approach to that of the reasonable employer test within South Africa (namely the 
‗deferential approach‘), as well as, the principles that have emerged by adopting such an 
approach. 
In South Africa, the position regarding the determination by an arbitrator of the fairness of a 
dismissal is governed by the Code of Good Practice. The Code notes that it is generally 
inappropriate for an employer to dismiss an employee for a first offence, except where the 
offence is ‗serious and of such gravity‘
57
 and that it renders the ‗employment relationship 
intolerable‘.
58




The court in Computicket v Marcus No and Others,
60
 one of the earlier judgements on the 
matter, held that the ‗question of sanction for misconduct is one on which reasonable people 
can readily differ‘.
61
  It was held that: 
‗One person may consider that the dismissal is the appropriate sanction for an offence, 
another that something less would be appropriate. There are obviously instances in which a 
reasonable person would naturally conclude that dismissal was the appropriate sanction, for 
example if there had been theft of a significant amount of money or untrustworthy conduct on 
the part of the third respondent. There are obviously circumstances in which dismissal would 
not be warranted. I take for instance an employee who is five minutes late for work in 
circumstances in which the misconduct has no prejudicial consequences for the employee.‘
62
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In conclusion the court found that ‗between these two poles there is a range of possible 
circumstances in which one person might take a view different from another without either of 





 as authority, Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza
65
 in dealing 
with the appropriateness of sanction found that: 
‗The determination of an appropriate sanction is a matter which is largely within the 
discretion of the employer. However, this discretion must be exercised fairly. A court should, 
therefore, not lightly interfere with the sanction imposed by the employer unless the employer 
acted unfairly in imposing the sanction. The question is not whether the court would have 
imposed the sanction imposed by the employer, but whether in the circumstances of the case 
the sanction was reasonable.‘
66
 
Furthermore the court in relying on British Leyland found that ‗in judging the reasonableness 
of the sanction imposed the courts must remember that there is a ―band of reasonableness‖ 




An acknowledgment that the discretion to dismiss lies with the employer, does not in fact 
mean that the decision that results from exercising such a discretion is beyond impeachment 
but signifies that such a decision must stand insofar as it satisfies the Constitutional 
imperative of fairness. This acknowledgment represents an objective inquiry into the 
reasoning of the person exercising that discretion in order to determine the fairness thereof. 
In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
and Others,
68
 the court held that ‗commissioners must exercise greater caution when they 
consider the fairness of the sanction imposed by the employer...They should not interfere 
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with the sanction merely because they do not like it. There must be a measure of deference 
[emphasis added] to the sanction imposed by the employer subject [emphasis added] to the 
requirement that the sanction imposed by the employer must be fair.‘
69
 
What can be gathered from the above cases is that the concept of a ‗range of reasonable 
responses‘ has filtered through from the English reasonable employer test. As in English case 
law, there is no further expansion on the range of reasonableness except to the degree that the 
decision may set aside if it is ‗unreasonable‘. In addition, great respect and reverence is given 
to the decision of the employer; even the arbitrator is cautioned against undermining the 
employer‘s managerial prerogative to impose a particular sanction. The court in Nampak
70
 
and County Fair Foods
71
 reiterate that there ought to be deference accorded to the employer 
subject to the constraints of fairness. Yet the courts fail to expand on how these constraints of 
fairness apply, leaving the employer and arbitrator to his or her own devices.  
The court in County Fair Foods went on to state that: 
‗Where an employer upon investigation, has acted fairly in imposing the sanction, the 
commissioner should not disturb it. There mere fact that the commissioner may have imposed 
a somewhat different sanction or a somewhat more sever sanction than the employer would 




A cautionary statement issued by the court was that: 
‗If commissioners could substitute their judgement and discretion for the judgement and 
discretion fairly exercised by the employers, then, the function of management would have 
been abdicated – employees would take every case to the CCMA‘. This result in turn would 
not be fair to employers.‘
73
  
In Ngcobo J‘s view, ‗interference with the sanction imposed by the employer is only justified 
where the sanction is unfair... This would be the case where the ‗sanction is so excessive as to 
shock one‘s sense of fairness‘.
74
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A divergent approach from the preceding case law was seen in Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v 
Radebe and Others
75
 in which the court considered the origin of the reasonable employer test. 
The court stated that ‗the origins are in English statute law
76
 and it must be appreciated that 
the Act is quite differently worded, providing for the arbitrator to decide if the dismissal was 
fair‘
77
 (reference being made to English statute).  The court also found that the enquiry which 
then arises and which is specifically referred to in statute, is whether the employer acted 
reasonably and ‗whether it was within a range of reasonable responses for the employer to 
dismiss the employee in the circumstances‘.
78
   
The court in Toyota SA Motors stated that it did ‗not believe that the reasonable employer test 
forms part of our law‘
79
 and the application thereof was a ‗palpable mistake‘
80
 which allowed 
it to be overruled.
81
 Although the Toyota SA Motors judgment was subsequently overruled by 
the Labour Court of Appeal in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others,
82
 it aptly identified the predicament of 
applying the ‗reasonable employer‘ test which is based on English statute to South African 
law which is based on a completely different piece of legislation. 
In South African law, the arbitrator is not tasked with determining whether the dismissal was 
‗fair‘ but rather whether it was ‗unfair‘. In addition there is no mention of the 
‗reasonableness‘ of the employer‘s decision to dismiss but rather the appropriateness.
83
 In 
terms of the application of a ‗deferential approach‘, the courts in finding that the employer 
acted reasonably ultimately allows for possibly unfair decisions of the employer to fall within 
the extensive bounds of the ‗band of reasonableness‘. 
In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others
84
 Willis JA pointed out that County Fair Foods
85
 ‗correctly defers to 
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employers in cases where there is considerable doubt or divergence of reasonable opinion as 
to appropriate sanction‘.
86
 The court held that: 
‗The onus is on the employer to prove the facts upon which he relies for the dismissal. If the 
facts upon which the employer relies are not proven at the end of the arbitration 
proceedings...the employer has failed to prove the fairness of the dismissal. On the other 
hand, if the employer does prove the facts upon which he relies, then the arbitrator must make 
a determination as to whether or not the dismissal is unfair ...The arbitrator is not at large to 
substitute what he or she considers to be a fair sanction in the circumstances...‘
87
 
The court further contended that: 
‗There must, in other words, be a degree of deference towards an employer‘s decision. To say 
this is not to resurrect the ―reasonable employer‖ test. It  means that the arbitrator must take 
into account the prevailing norms and values of society of our society, paying particular 
regard to the norms and values of the industrial relations community...‘
88
   
In these decisions the notion of fairness in dismissals was significantly undermined by courts 
adopting an excessively deferential approach towards the position of the employer and at 
times completely failing to take into account the interests of the employee. In light of the fact 
that the LRA seeks to the give effect to the Constitutional imperative of fair labour practices 
for everyone; it is to be concluded that the legislature‘s vision of fairness will in fact 
incorporate the balancing of interests of all the parties and invariably include the interests of 
the employee. Whilst the South African ‗deferential approach‘ does not equate to the 
excessively deferential approach apparent in the United Kingdom and does not seek to 
‗resurrect‘ the ‗reasonable employer‘ test in its purest form;
89
 it fails to adequately address 
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THE CALL FOR REFORM IN SIDUMO  
 
4.1. The deferential approach in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v 
CCMA and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA)  
The court commences its judgment by pointing out that: 
‗[A] CCMA commissioner is not vested with a discretion to impose a sanction in the case of 
workplace incapacity or misconduct. That discretion belongs in the first instance to the 
employer. The commissioner enjoys no discretion in relation to sanction, but bears the duty of 
determining whether the employer's sanction is fair.‘
90
 
The court expanding on the role of the commissioner held that: 
 
‗The criterion of fairness denotes a range of possible responses, all of which could properly 
be described as fair. The use of 'fairness' in everyday language reflects this. We may describe 
a decision as 'very fair' (when we mean that it was generous to the offender); or 'more than 
fair' (when we mean that it was lenient); or we may say that it was 'tough, but fair', or even 
'severe, but fair' (meaning that while one's own decisional response might have been different, 
it is not possible to brand the actual response unfair). It is in this latter category, particularly, 
that CCMA commissioners must exercise great caution in evaluating decisions to dismiss. 
The mere fact that a CCMA commissioner may have imposed a different sanction does not 
justify concluding that the sanction was unfair. Commissioners must bear in mind that 





It was held that, ‗[t]here must be a measure of deference to the employers sanction, because 
under the LRA, it is primarily the function of the employer to decide on the proper 
sanction.‘
92
 The court stated that in determining the fairness of sanction, ‗the commissioner 
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need not be convinced that the dismissal is the only fair sanction...the statute only requires 
that the employer establish that it is a fair sanction‘.
93
 
The court not only employed legal precedent but also the LRA to defend a deferential 
approach towards the employer‘s point of view. What is notable is that, in examining the 
employer‘s reasons for the decision to dismiss, the court did not consider the reasonableness 
of the employer‘s decision, as done so by the courts applying a ‗deferential approach‘ in the 
past; but rather considered the fairness of the decision in general terms.  
4.2. Rejection of the deferential approach in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd and Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)  
The Constitutional Court commenced its judgement by referring directly to section 23(1) of 
the Constitution which provides that ‗everyone has the right to fair labour practices‘.
94
 The 
court went on to state that ‗[o]ne of the primary purposes of the LRA is to give effect to the 
fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution‘.
95
  
It was found by Navsa AJ, writing for the majority, that ‗the Supreme Court of Appeal placed 
undue reliance on item 7 (b) (iv) of the Code which requires the Commissioner to consider 
whether the dismissal was ―an‖ appropriate sanction‘.
96
 The court went on to state that ‗the 
code derives from NEDLAC and is a guide. In any event it cannot take precedence over the 
Constitution and provisions of the LRA‘.
97
 It added that: 
‗There is nothing in the constitutional and statutory scheme that suggests that, in determining 
the fairness of a dismissal, a commissioner must approach the matter from the perspective of 
the employer. All indications are to the contrary.‘
98
 
The court stated that ‗[a] plain reading of all the relevant provisions compels the conclusion 
that the commissioner is to determine the dismissal dispute as an impartial adjudicator...Any 
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suggestion by the Supreme Court of Appeal that the deferential approach is rooted in the 
prescripts of the LRA cannot be sustained‘.
99
  
The rationale behind the rejection of ‗deferential approach‘ is rooted in the purposive 
interpretation of the LRA. In terms of Constitutional imperatives, the courts are tasked with 
developing the law to the extent that the legislation does not give effect to a right in the Bill 
of Rights.
100
 Thus the approach to the ‗appropriateness of sanction‘ must be developed to 
give effect to the right to fair labour practices;
101
 which would require that the interests of 
both the employer and employee to be taken into account. 
The role of the commissioner can be summarised from the judgment as follows:  
‗In approaching the dismissal dispute impartially a commissioner will take into account the 
totality of circumstances. He or she will necessarily take into account the importance of the 
rule that had been breached. The commissioner must of course consider the reason the 
employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, as he or she must take into account the basis of 
the employee's challenge to the dismissal. There are other factors that will require 
consideration. For example, the harm caused by the employee's conduct, whether additional 
training and instruction may result in the employee not repeating the misconduct, the effect of 
dismissal on the employee and his or her long-service record. This is not an exhaustive list.  
To sum up. In terms of the LRA, a commissioner has to determine whether a dismissal is fair 
or not. A commissioner is not given the power to consider afresh what he or she would do, but 
simply to decide whether what the employer did was fair. In arriving at a decision a 
commissioner is not required to defer to the decision of the employer. What is required is that 
he or she must consider all relevant circumstances.‘
102
 (Emphasis added.) 
 
It has been contended that with regard to practice, the judgment may give an impression to 
some that the employer‘s prerogative to decide whether to dismiss or retain an offending 
employee has been completely undermined.
103
 Grogan contends that ‗Sidumo may be read as 
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giving commissioners carte blanche when it comes to deciding whether to substitute their 
views on what constitutes a proper sanction in a particular case‘.
104
  
However the potential abuse that Grogan suggests is only a possibility where arbitrators 
misinterpret the scope of their authority or fail to balance the various factors specifically laid 
down in the Sidumo judgment. The reasonable commissioner test, in itself, does not 
undermine an employer‘s managerial prerogative however an arbitrator in balancing the 
countervailing factors laid down in Sidumo, according to his own sense of fairness, may 
misconstrue and exceed his scope of authority. 
A further point to note is that the Sidumo judgment has also limited the powers of the courts 
to review the decision of an arbitrator in the determination of sanction; the award will only be 
set aside if the decision reached by the commissioner is one that a reasonable decision maker 
could not reach.
105
 Thus the potential for abuse coupled with the courts limited powers of 




Navsa AJ found that the inquiry into the fairness of the dismissal involves the balancing of 
competing interests.
107
  The court considered Nampak
108
 and County Fair Food
109
 and found 
that these judgements unfortunately ‗resorted to the reasonable employer test used in 
England‘. It was held that the test has its origins in statute, the provisions of which are very 
different to the provisions of the LRA.
110
 Furthermore it was held by the court that: 
‗The approach followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal has been extensively criticized in 




The court in Sidumo held that ‗[t]he Constitution seeks to redress the power imbalance 
between the employees and employers...neither the Constitution nor the LRA affords any 
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preferential status to the employers view on the fairness of dismissal‘.
112
 As a result the court 




The judgment succinctly summarises the reason why the ‗deferential approach‘ is to be 
rejected as well as puts forward the foundation of developing a new test. Whilst finding that 
fairness dictates a balancing between the interest of the employer and employee and that a 
deferential approach fails to do so; the court makes a potentially risky statement by stating 
that ‗the commissioner‘s sense of fairness is what must prevail and not the employer‘s 
view‘.
114
 It is this very phrase that seems to be the essence of the reformed approach to 
sanction. It may be assumed by some that the employer‘s point of view is completely 
disregarded in the enquiry into the appropriateness of sanction; it is this assumption that 
creates a potential concern. Nevertheless on a proper reading of the Sidumo
115
 judgment these 
concerns can be allayed in light of the qualifying factors the court goes on to discuss 
regarding how the commissioner is to fulfil his functions. 
The issue before Ngcobo J, writing for the minority, was whether there are any constraints on 
the exercise of the commissioner‘s power to determine fairness.
116
In answering the above 
question, he states that the LRA requires commissioners to take into account the Code of 
Good Practice: Dismissal issued under the LRA.  In terms of the Code, ‗the question of 
whether or not the dismissal is for fair reason must be determined by the facts of the case and 
the appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty‘.
117
 
 He suggests that it is clear that ‗the LRA and Code impose certain constraints on the powers 
of the commissioners‘.
118
 Furthermore Item 7 of the Code ‗requires a commissioner to, in 
considering whether a dismissal is fair, to consider the reasonableness of the employer‘s rule 
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He concludes that ‗it is no doubt the prerogative of the employer to determine in the first 
instance that it will dismiss employees who are guilty of particular infractions of its 
disciplinary code and then in a particular case decide whether to impose that sanction‘.
120
  
What is worrying is that in the majority judgment, Navsa J unequivocally points out that the 
Code of Good Practice is no more than a guideline to which the weight of law cannot attach, 
however it is this Code that Ngcobo J relies upon to restrain the commissioner‘s power to act 
outside his authority. 
Ngcobo J then goes on to discuss the employers discretion and how it is to be utilised.  
‗When an employer determines what is an appropriate sanction in a particular case, the 
employer may have to choose among possible sanctions...[t]he employer must apply his or 
her mind to the facts and determine the appropriate response...[i]t is in this sense that the 
employer may be said to have discretion.‘
121
  
However it is further suggested by Ngcobo J that: 
 ‗[R]ecognising that the employer has such discretion does not mean that the commissioner 
must defer to the employer...[w]hat this means is that the commissioner, as the CCMA 
submitted,  does not start with a blank page and determine afresh what the appropriate 
sanction is.‘
122  
Furthermore it was held that ‗the commissioner‘s task is not to ask what the appropriate 
sanction is, but whether the employer‘s decision to dismiss is fair‘.
123
   
Lastly Ngcobo J suggests that the commissioner must pass a ‗value judgement‘.
124
 Thus: 
‗However objective the determination of fairness of a dismissal might be it is based on a 
value judgment. Indeed the exercise of a value judgement is something which reasonable 
people may readily differ. It could not have been the intention of the lawmaker to leave the 
determination of fairness to the unconstrained value judgment of the commissioner. Were that 
to have been the case the outcome of a dispute could be determine by the background and 
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perspective of the commissioner. Yet fairness requires that regard must be had to the interests 
of both the workers and those of the employer.‘
125
   
The minority judgment also touches upon which factors the commissioner must take into 
consideration:  
‗What is required is of a commissioner is to take seriously the reasons for the employer 
establishing the rule and prescribing the penalty of dismissal for breach of it... [i]t is not for 
the commissioner to set aside the disciplinary system merely because he prefers different 
standards...The commissioner should respect the fact that the employer is likely to have 
greater knowledge of the demands of business ... The commissioner must seek to understand 
the rule adopted by the employer and its importance in running the business and then weigh 
these factors in the overall determination of fairness.‘
126
  
The judgment has listed various factors that may possibly ensure that the power of the 
commissioner to determine the appropriateness of sanction, based on his own sense of 
fairness, will be constrained. By the court allocating such expansive authority to the 
commissioner, there is potential that a commissioner may exceed the bounds of his authority 
by imputing his sense of fairness without a proper balancing of the employer‘s and 
employee‘s rights. Whilst the court has laid down specific guidelines to ensure 
commissioners perform their functions properly, the Labour and Labour Appeal Court‘s 
limited power to review and set aside the commissioner‘s award creates a potential for abuse 
of power by commissioners. As will be seen in the following chapter, the inconsistency and 
potential abuse that can arise when a commissioner uses his ‗own sense of fairness‘ 
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CASE LAW AFTER SIDUMO 
 
This chapter seeks to examine how the courts have interpreted the reformed approach 
towards sanction i.e. the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ test, as well as to consider factors that 
will assist and contribute to the development of a new approach to sanction in the future.  
One of the cases decided after Sidumo
127
 is Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & 
Others
128
 in which Patel JA made the following observation: 
‗The Sidumo case enjoins a court to remind itself that the task of determining the fairness of a 
dismissal falls primarily within the domain of the commissioner. This was the legislative 
intent and as much as decisions of different commissioners may lead to different results, it is 




It is important to investigate ‗who‘ has the burden of enduring this uncertainty; it seems that 
the position of the employer has been somewhat compromised in that he or she has no real 
semblance of consistency to rely on. It is hoped that the lack of certainty and the presence of 
inconsistency which plagued the ‗reasonable employer‘ approach and the ‗deferential 
approach‘ will not render the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ test flawed as well.  
The issue of the commissioner‘s ‗sense of fairness‘ raises a question as to whether undue 
deference towards the employer has been replaced by undue deference towards the 
commissioner.  In theory the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ approach seems to balance the rights 
of both the employer and the employee but the possibility of abuse in practice may 
undermine the efficacy of the approach. 
In Fidelity Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others
130
 the Labour Appeal Court made the following observations about 
the Sidumo Judgement:   
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―When a commissioner of the CCMA is called upon to decide whether dismissal as a sanction 
is fair in the particular case  he or she must not apply the reasonable employer test, must not 






 Zondo JP summarises the factors the commissioner must take into 
account when performing his functions: 
‗(a)   'take into account the totality of circumstances' (para 78);  
 (b)   'consider the importance of the rule that had been breached' (para 78); 
 (c)   'consider the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, as he or she must       
take into account the basis of the employee's challenge to the dismissal' (para 78); 
(d)   consider 'the harm caused by the employee's conduct' (para 78);  
(e)   consider 'whether additional training and instruction may result in the employee not 
repeating the misconduct'; 
(f)   consider 'the effect of dismissal on the employee' (para 78); 




It was held that after the above factors are considered, the commissioner must decide 
‗whether dismissal was in all circumstances fair...[t]hat the commissioner is required to use 
his own sense of fairness does not mean that he or she is at liberty to act arbitrarily or 





 does no more than summarise the position of the Constitutional 
Court in Sidumo. The fact that the commissioner must consider the reason for the employer 
imposing the sanction and the harm caused by the employee‘s conduct both point to the 
consideration of managerial prerogative and the legitimate right of employers to conduct their 
businesses as they please, within the bounds of the law of course. The other listed factors that 
consider progressive discipline or the effect of the dismissal on the employee illustrate the 
fundamental right of employees to fair labour practices in tandem with the employer‘s right 
to managerial prerogative. The consideration of competing interests will inevitably result in a 
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fair outcome however the fact that the balancing of these competing interests is done solely 
through the prism of the commissioner‘s sense of fairness may have anything but fair 
consequences for the employer and employee. 
In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Sebotha NO and Others
136
, the court in comparing the 
demise of the ‗reasonable employer‘ test to the abolishment of the death penalty and corporal 
punishment, found that in light of the Sidumo judgment: 
‗There are various prophets of doom about what would be happening to discipline in the 
workplace. Some employers were able to dismiss employees on the basis of the reasonable 
employer‘s test...Commissioners are not there to rubber stamp decisions taken by employers. 
Commissioners are enjoined to decide whether an employee‘s dismissal is fair or unfair. The 
reasonable employer‘s test is no longer part of our law.‘
137 
Furthermore the court cautions the employer, the employee as well as the commissioner 
about the potential abuse of the reformed approach to sanction in Sidumo.
138
 Francis J states 
that:  
‗The message as I understand it arising from Sidumo is that the employer cannot impose 
discipline as it used to do in the past. It does not give the employees the licence to commit 
misconduct at their whim in the hope that it would use Sidumo as a defence. It requires the 
employer to revisit its approach, the issue of sanction at the workplace, and apply the 
principles which have been given. Employers cannot approach the issue of sanction as if 
Sidumo does not exist. There must be a balance. Commissioners are not the agents of 
employers but are like umpires who must decide the issue of fairness.‘
139 
In Theewaterskloof Municipality v SALGBC (Western Cape Division) and Others
140
 the 




 stated that:   
‗[T]he core enquiry to be made by a commissioner will involve the balancing of the reason 
why the employer imposed the dismissal against the basis of the employee's challenge of it. 
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That requires a proper understanding of both, which must then be weighed together with all 
other relevant factors in order to determine whether the employer's decision was fair.‘
143
   
 
The court then considered the minority judgment in Sidumo
144
 and found that ‗the ―value 
element‖ does not mean that commissioners may simply import their own values as the basis 
for deciding a dismissal dispute‘.
145
 The court acknowledged a difficulty that may arise in 
that a commissioner must at the same time employ his own sense of fairness in reaching a 
conclusion. The court noted that: 
‗Reaching a value judgement in relation to competing factors will in many cases be fairly 
straightforward but in others it may be helpful to conduct a comparison process with 
reference to a common question, being how the factor relates to the relevant features of the 
employers operational requirements. A proper assessment of those requirements underlies the 
determination of what is fair and at the same time provides an objective framework for the 
value to be placed on factor and another.‘
146  
Such a realistic approach of the court in considering any inherent deficiencies is to be 
commended. Not only does the court identify a possible loophole for abuse but also 
prescribes a possible remedy. In the courts opinion, a sound and objective consideration 
would be the employers ‗operational requirements‘, which could temper the potential abuse 
that may arise in a commissioner utilising his or her own sense of fairness. Perhaps this 
objective criterion of the employer‘s operational requirements may form part of a revised 
approach to sanction. In identifying that a value judgment and the commissioners sense of 
fairness may in fact distort the objectivity of the test and in essence distort the determination 
of fairness as well, the ‗common question‘
147
 the court refers to could ensure that operational 
requirements introduce an objective element. 
The court in Westonaria Local Municipality v SALGBC and Others,
148
 in dealing with the 
issue of sanction, noted that the central questioned to be asked was whether the dismissal was 
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fair and held that ‗[t]he person to answer this question is the arbitrator and no one else.‘
149
 
The court proceeded to refer to Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCMA and Others
150
 which held that: 
‗The Act requires the CCMA commissioner to decide whether a dismissal is unfair. In effect, 
the statute puts the following question to the CCMA commissioner: ―Is this dismissal fair?‖ 
In my view, the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the word ―fair‖, when anybody 
is asked whether dismissal is fair in a particular case, is that such person should answer that 








 as well, the court in Westonaria concluded 
that an enquiry which deals with the appropriateness of sanction is one to be left to the 
‗discretion of the arbitrator‘.
154
 
In Samancor Chrome Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) v Metal and Engineering Industries 
Bargaining Council and Others
155
 the Labour Court of Appeal applied the ‗reasonable 
commissioner‘ test by incorporating a consideration of the factors, many of which have now 
been listed in the CCMA Guidelines. The court clearly set out the role of the commissioner 
and how this role is to be carried out. The court stated as follows: 
 
‗Firstly, the duty to determine whether a dismissal is fair or not rests with the 
commissioner...Secondly, the decision whether or not the sanction imposed by an employer is 
fair in a particular case is a value judgment which the commissioner is required to make on 
the basis of his/her own sense of fairness. Thirdly, each case must be decided on its own 
merits and with due regard to the totality of the circumstances - an objective approach 
(Sidumo at para 64 and 68.)...Other factors may include the seriousness of the misconduct and 
the gravity thereof with relation to the continued employment relationship as well as the 
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employee's previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances, the nature of the 




In the recent decision of Wasteman Group v South African Municipal Workers' Union,
157
 
Davis JA in interpreting Sidumo
158
 and the powers of the commissioner found that, [t]he 
commissioner is required to come to an independent decision as to whether the employer‘s 
decision was fair in the circumstances, these circumstances being established by the factual 
matrix confronting the commissioner‘.
159
  
Davis JA explained the above to mean that the commissioner had to decide on his own 
whether the action undertaken by the employer was fair in the circumstances; this enquiry 
would not take into account what the commissioner would have ‗personally decided‘
160
 but 
whether the employer‘s decision can be viewed as ‗fair‘.
161
 He further points out that in 
conducting an enquiry into the fairness of the sanction imposed, ‗deference cannot enter into 
the decision making power‘.
162
 
Thus each case must be considered in light of its unique facts; the manner in which the 
balancing of competing interests is conducted cannot be mechanically applied in every case. 
The commissioner would have to consider the facts and consider which factors in that 
specific instance may or may not outweigh each other. 
The court in South African Breweries Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others
163
elaborated on the approach adopted by the court in Wasteman.
164
 
However South African Breweries goes further to clarify the role of the commissioner in 
comparing it to the role of a reviewing court. The court explained as follows:  
                                                          
156
 Para 33 & 34. 
157
 Wasteman Group v South African Municipal Workers' Union (CA6/2011) [2012] ZALAC (8 March 2012). 
158
 In particular para 78-79 of the Sidumo Constitutional Court judgment. 
159
 Page 7. 
160




 Ibid.  
163
 South African Breweries Ltd v CCMA and Others (C665/2011) [2012] ZALCCT 17 (24 MAY 2012). 
164
 Para 26, Steenkamp J held that ‗[i]n my view, the commissioner‘s view can best be summarised thus: The 
employer decides to dismiss. The commissioner conducts an arbitration de novo. In the light of the totality of 
circumstances, established by the evidence at arbitration, the commissioner must then decide whether the 
decision to dismiss was fair. In doing so, it is the commissioner‘s own sense of fairness that must prevail. There 




‗The commissioner must decide whether the decision to dismiss was fair; this court may only 
decide whether the arbitrator‘s decision was so unreasonable that no other arbitrator could 
have reached the same decision. Even if the court‘s own sense of fairness may dictate a 
different outcome, it cannot interfere with the decision of the arbitrator. The converse applies 
to the arbitrator when deciding whether the employer‘s decision to dismiss was fair.‘
165
 
There are a number of cases that expound further principles that may be useful in interpreting 
and applying the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ test. The balancing of competing interests is an 
essential element of the ‗reasonable commissioner‘ approach, with that said, the 
commissioner responsible for conducting such a balancing act bears a heavy responsibility 
and his own sense of fairness or value judgment may undermine the objectivity of such an 
approach. Thus while all these legitimate factors from both the perspective of the employer 
and employee has been extrapolated, there needs to be an objective element that will combat 
potential abuse that may arise from a ‗deferential approach‘ towards the decision of the 
commissioner. The operational requirements of the employer seem to be a sound ground for 
introducing objectivity and may contribute to a revised approach (herein referred to as the 
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FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DETERMINATION OF AN 
APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
 
The factors to be considered by an arbitrator in determining an appropriate sanction, are now 
consolidated in the CCMA Guidelines but were initially crystallised in case law. In order to 
grasp the substance of factors listed in the Guidelines, it is critical to understand them against 
the backdrop of the cases that gave meaning to them. According to Item 7 of the Guidelines:  
‗Determining whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction involves three inquiries: an 
enquiry into the gravity of the contravention of the rule; an enquiry into consistency of the 




6.1. Gravity of the contravention 
According to the Guidelines: 
‗There are two enquiries involved in assessing the gravity of the contravention. The first 
concerns any sanction prescribed by the employer for the misconduct. The second enquiry 
relates to any aggravating factors that may make the contravention more serious or mitigating 
factors that may make it less serious.‘
167 
With regard to the gravity of the contravention itself, Grogan suggests that ‗the more serious 
the offence, the more likely the employer will consider dismissal appropriate‘.
168
 He submits 
that minor contraventions may also be viewed in a ‗serious light‘
169
 and warrant dismissal 
depending on the circumstances. Furthermore he submits that it may ‗not always be necessary 
to dismiss an employee for offences listed in the Code‘.
170
 He states that the ‗courts have 
made it clear that an employer should at least allow the employee to plead mitigation and the 
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6.1.1. Workplace Rules and Sanction prescribed by the employer 
The Code of Good Practice states that: 
‗All employers should adopt disciplinary rules that establish the standard of conduct required 
of their employees. The form and content of disciplinary rules will obviously vary according 
to the size and nature if the employers business.‘
172
  
The court in Consani Engineering (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
173
 consolidates the 
reasoning of earlier judgements on this point. The court in Consani firstly acknowledged the 
reasoning in the Computicket v Marcus NO and others
174
 namely that ‗[t]he employer sets the 
standard and has the right to determine the sanction with which non-compliance with the 
standard will be visited‘. 
 It went on to state that ‗[t]he decision-maker should embark upon the reasoning process of 
assessing a sanction by recognising that, within limits, the employer is entitled to set its own 
standards of conduct in the workplace having regard to the exigencies of its business‘.
175
  
According to Du Toit, ‗disciplinary rules are intended to create certainty and consistency in 
the application of discipline‘.
176
  Furthermore ‗[t]he required standards of conduct must be 
clear and communicated to employees in a way that they can understand‘.
177
 Lastly the 
employer should consider its disciplinary code as a ‗guideline‘
178
 and ‗may still have regard 
to the Code of Good Practice‘.
179
 On this point Du Toit relies on Changula v Bell 
Equipment
180
 where the Labour Appeal Court held that the (employer‘s) code contains 
‗discretionary and not obligatory provisions‘.
181
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‗While it is correct that the disciplinary code permitted some discretion requiring each case to 
be considered on its merits, such did not amount to an absolute bar to the subsequent and 
legitimate adoption of a zero-tolerance policy, which the evidence reflects was properly 
communicated to the workforce [my emphasis]. Indeed, once the policy had been 
communicated, the imposition of the dismissal penalty, in the light of that communication, 




According to the Constitutional Court in Sidumo,
184
 ‗the commissioner when evaluating the 
decision of the employer must apply his mind to the facts and determine an appropriate 
response in light of the disciplinary code‘
185
 furthermore ‗the commissioner must seek to 
understand the reasons for the particular rule being adopted and the importance in the running 




The rationale behind the employer advocating reasons for workplace rules and the value of 
such reasons is well illustrated in Samancor
187
 The applicant employer operated a smeltery; 
two of his employees namely a floor operator and a crane operator, were charged with failure 
to perform certain functions in breach of the employer's strict safety rules.
188
 The court, when 
considering the appropriate sanction to be imposed for such misconduct, held that: 
 
‗It is evident from the evidence that there are considerable risks associated with the 
appellant's operations at the smeltery. It carries a high risk of potential danger to the safety of 
its employees which in turn may hold serious consequences for the appellant as the employer. 
The issue of safety and the rules pertaining thereto are accordingly of considerable 
importance to both the appellant and its employees...Accordingly, in the context of the present 
matter, the importance of the safety rules concerned, the reasons for their existence, and the 
seriousness and potentially life threatening consequences of a breach of such rules are 
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Therefore it is apparent that the Guidelines advocate a process whereby the employer‘s 
reasons for adopting certain disciplinary policies must be given serious consideration in light 
of the employer‘s operational requirements and individual business needs. No two businesses 
are the same and the legislature has acknowledged this by allowing an employer to run his 
business efficiently and to set his own workplace rules and standards provided that they are 
reasonable. The arbitrator‘s right to intervene in the sanction imposed by the employer only 
becomes effective when the employer fails to utilise his power and authority in a fair manner. 
Until such a time, the employer is, according to the plain reading of the Guidelines, entitled 
to run his business as he pleases.  
 
6.1.2. Circumstances of the Contravention: Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
According to the Guidelines:  
 
‗Aggravating factors may include wilfulness, lack of remorse, not admitting to a blatant 
contravention of a rule, dishonesty in the disciplinary hearing, nature of the job and damage 
and loss incurred to the employer caused by the contravention. Aggravating circumstances 
may have the effect of justifying a more severe sanction than one prescribed in the code or 
normally imposed by employers...or may offset personal circumstances which may otherwise 




These factors will be considered below: 
 
6.1.2.1. Nature of the job 
 
In Anglo American farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo,
191
 the court found that due 
to the premeditation of the theft and that it was implemented over a period of time, a 
‗thieving propensity‘ was evidenced
192
 and could not be acceptable given the nature of the 
employee‘s job. The respondent was employed as a waiter and ‗[h]is duties 
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necessarily entailed handling the appellant's stock-in-trade‘.
193
 In the nature of things, this 
task could not practically be carried out without the employee being placed in a position of 
trust.
194
 In these circumstances the court held that ‗the effect of the respondent‘s misconduct 
on the relationship between the parties was such that its continuation would have been 
intolerable for the appellant‘.
195
 The court consequently found that the dismissal to be fair in 
the circumstances. 
 
In this case it is evident that the nature of the job and the position of trust are weighty factors 
in determining: firstly if the employment relationship can continue in light of the employer‘s 
business operations and secondly whether the risk of repetition of such misconduct by the 
employee is probable. The first factor considers the objective needs of the business and the 
second looks more closely and subjectively at the employee and his inclination to contravene 
a rule. The court concluded that: 
 
‗The theft, or attempted theft, was premeditated... It shows a 'thieving propensity' on 
respondent's part. It rendered his further employment intolerable, from applicant's point of 
view. Respondent persisted throughout in falsely maintaining that he was innocent, and gave 
a false explanation. At no time has he shown any remorse for his conduct. He knew in 
advance exactly what the potential consequences of his conduct... These are all, in my view, 
aggravating factors which enhance the fairness of the dismissal.‘
196
 
In considering the above passage, the court seemed to take a holistic approach to the offence, 
looking at contributing factors such as remorse and premeditation. Therefore it is up to the 
arbitrator when considering the employers sanction to evaluate any factor that may shed new 
light on the situation. These factors may be different and new in each employer‘s individual 
business setup. It is consequently for the arbitrator to apply his or her mind and sincerely 
search for them.  
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In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd,
197
 the court dealt specifically with the issue of remorse. 
It was held that: 
 
‗It would, in my view, be difficult for an employer to re-employ an employee who has shown 
no remorse...Acknowledgment of wrongdoing is the first step towards rehabilitation. In the 
absence of a recommitment to the employer's workplace values, an employee cannot hope to 




Furthermore the court stated that: 
 
‗Where, as in this case, an employee ‗over and above having committed an act of dishonesty, 
falsely denies having done so, an employer would, particularly where a high degree of trust is 
reposed in an employee, be legitimately entitled to say to itself that the risk of continuing to 




In addition to identifying remorse, or lack thereof, as a relevant factor the court went on to 
explain the significance of such consideration. In this instance the court considered remorse 
in light of the possibility of restoring the damaged relationship of trust. This judgement 
illustrates that arbitrators should consider all relevant factors that may arise in a particular 
situation. Furthermore the reasons the employer advances for dismissing an employee must 
incorporate these considerations. 
 
A lack of remorse for misconduct not only presupposes that the employee may repeat the 
offence but it may also deter an employer from imposing sanctions that seek to correct the 
employee‘s behaviour. Where it is apparent that the employee is not in fact receptive to 
correction, it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to commit to repairing the 
relationship of trust. In Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd
200
 the court held 
that where there is an ‗egregious act of dishonesty‘
201
 or conversely ‗a complete lack of 
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acknowledgement of any wrongdoing, there is a formidable obstacle in the way of the 




Furthermore where the employee has committed misconduct which involves gross 
dishonesty, the lack of remorse would seem to compound the risk to the employer‘s business 
and limit the possibility of restoration of the damaged relationship of trust. In Mutual 
Construction Co Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & Others
203
 the court stated that: 
‗The misconduct which the third respondent committed involved gross dishonesty and fraud 
which was bound to cause harm and prejudice to the appellant's business operation. It was 
also significant that the third respondent elected not to own up to his misdemeanour. In other 
words, he showed a complete lack of remorse or contrition for what he did.‘
204 
6.1.2.3. Seriousness of the Offence 
Hulett Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Bargaining Council for the Metal Industry & Others
205
 in 
dealing with the issue of the seriousness of the offence, held that ‗the presence of dishonesty 
tilts the scales to an extent that even the strongest mitigating factors, like long service and a 
clean record of discipline are likely to have minimal impact on the sanction to be imposed‘.
206
  
The court stated that: 
‗In other words whatever the amount of mitigation, the relationship is unlikely to be restored 
once dishonesty has been established in particular in a case where the employee shows no 
remorse. The reason for this is that there is a high premium placed on honesty because 
conduct that involves corruption by the employees damages the trust relationship which 
underpins the essence of the employment relationship.‘
207
  
There are various forms of misconduct that may warrant dismissal as a sanction, Hulett 
merely demonstrates that dishonesty is one of those. Due to the fact that all mitigating and 
aggravating factors are considered in an attempt to evaluate the relationship of trust between 
the parties, any factor which prima facie undermines that relationship will be deemed 
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sufficient to justify dismissal. In light of recent case law, proof that the relationship of trust 
has been irreparably damaged must be produced by those making the allegation.
208
 
The court in Hulett
209
 also held that it would be ‗unfair for the court to expect the applicant to 
take back the employee when she has persisted with her denials and has not shown any 
remorse‘.
210
 Although it is often the employee who is on the receiving end of any unfairness, 
it is interesting to see what the court deems would be unfair on the employer and its business 
needs and interests. 
6.1.2.4. Loss Suffered 
With regard to loss incurred by the employer due to the contravention, the court in Anglo 
American farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant
211
 held that: 
 
‗There is no doubt that the value of an article which is stolen may, and often does, play a 
significant role when the question of an appropriate penalty is considered. However this role 
is not always, or necessarily, such that low value is always a conclusive indication that only a 




The court found itself in agreement with the submissions made on behalf of counsel for the 
employer; and stated that: 
 
‗The value of what was stolen was of comparatively little importance in this matter, and that 
the true question to be considered was whether or not what respondent did had the effect of 
destroying, or of seriously damaging, the relationship of employer and employee between the 




Once again all factors are considered in light of the relationship of trust. Therefore the 
principle that is enunciated is that, irrespective of whether an employee steals one million or 
one rand, once the relationship of trust and confidence has been destroyed, the employer is 
under no obligation to continue to employ that person. Once the employer alleges and proves 
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the breakdown in trust, the decision to dismiss rests with the employer; however, whether the 
decision will be deemed to be appropriate and fair in the circumstances will ultimately be 
determined by the commissioner. 
  
In developing a ‗balanced approach‘ to sanction, an objective element to incorporate in the 
approach would be the consideration of the operational requirements of the employer; 
however there is also a need to consider certain subjective elements, such as the aggravating 
and mitigating factors discussed in this chapter. What can be concluded is that, although the 
commissioner is required to consider issues such as remorse and dishonesty, these 
considerations really involve the effect of the employee‘s misconduct on the ‗relationship of 
trust‘. Although the relationship of trust will be discussed in further detail,
214
 at this point it is 
worth mentioning that whilst the employer‘s operational requirements may form the objective 
leg of the ‗balanced approach‘; consideration of the relationship of trust could form the 
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CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE RULE 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the fundamental principles regarding the consistent 
imposition of sanction. It is of necessity that the commissioner, in applying his own sense of 
fairness, is well acquainted with the legal principles, the rationale behind them and how he or 
she is to interpret the requirements of fairness.  
 
In terms of Code of Good Practice: 
 
‗The employer should apply the penalty of dismissal consistently with the way in which it has 
been applied to the same and other employees in the past, and consistently as between two or 
more employees who participate in the misconduct under consideration.‘
215 
 
According to the Guidelines, ‗if an employee leads evidence that another employee similarly 
placed was not dismissed for a contravention of the same rule, the employer must justify the 
difference of treatment‘.
216
 Furthermore the Guidelines state that ‗[u]nless the employer can 
provide a legitimate basis for differentiating between two similarly placed employees, a 
disparity in treatment is unfair‘.
217
 Therefore inconsistency in applying certain sanctions is 
not completely prohibited. Should an employer treat employees differently, his conduct will 
not be rendered unfair on that fact alone. Only if the employer fails to show a valid reason for 
such discrepancy will his conduct be challenged.  
The court in Cape Town City Council v Masitho and Others
218
  in considering SACCAWU 
and Others v Irvin and Johnson
219
 pointed out that: 
‗In SACCAWU and Others v Irvin and Johnson [1999] 8 BLLR 741 (LAC) at 751B this court 
reiterated that consistency is an element of disciplinary fairness, and that it 'is really the 
perception of bias inherent in selective discipline which makes it unfair', but went on to 
                                                          
215
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observe that the flexibility which is inherent in the exercise of discretion will inevitably create 
the potential for some inconsistency.‘
220
 
The discretion that the court speaks of is the general discretion awarded to employers to 
identify the types of misconduct that will justify dismissal and the discretion to apply that 
sanction in individual cases of employee misconduct. Even if the employer has valid reasons 
to treat employees differently and the result is in fact fair, there may be a misplaced 
assumption that where there is inconsistency there is also injustice.  
According to Cape Town City Council:
221
 
‘Fairness, of course, is a value judgment, to be determined in the circumstances of the 
particular case, and for that reason there is necessarily room for flexibility, but where two 
employees have committed the same wrong, and there is nothing else to distinguish them, I 
can see no reason why they ought not generally to be dealt with the same.‘
222
  
In Gcwensha v CCMA & others
223
 the court explained the concept of consistency in light of 
an employer‘s decision to impose disciplinary action. Nicholson JA stated that: 
‗In SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others v Irvin and Johnson Ltd 
(1999) 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC), this Court set out the principles of consistent employment 
discipline. Disciplinary consistency is the hallmark of progressive labour relations and the 
―parity principle‖ merely requires that every employee must be measured by the same 
standards. Discipline must also not be capricious nor should there be any perception of bias 
when comparing employees care should be taken to ensure that the gravity of the misconduct 
is evaluated and the discipline record of the two employees compared. No extraneous matters 
should be regarded and a comparison has to be made between all the relevant features that are 
normally considered when one employee is disciplined.‘
224
  
In a recently handed down judgment, the court in Westonaria
225
 in dealing with the 
appropriateness of sanction and consistency, held that:  
‗The employer has the responsibility of setting the standard of conduct he or she requires 
employees to comply with and to apply such standard consistently. Failure to apply the 
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standard consistently could lead to the conclusion that non-compliance with the standard by 
the employee cannot be regarded as serious enough to warrant a dismissal.‘
226
 
The Guidelines clearly stipulate that: ‗[i]t is not inconsistent to treat employees charged with 
the same misconduct differently if there is a fair and objective basis‘
227
 for example an 
employee‘s previous disciplinary record.
228
 In SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and 
Others v Ikhwezi Bus Service
229
 the court held that ‗an employer is entitled in general terms to 
impose different penalties on different employees for the same act of misconduct, provided 




In light of SA Transport, when an existing disciplinary record is the differentiating factor, 
prior disciplinary action short of dismissal (in particular, warnings) can be relevant in the 
following way. If the disciplinary record of one employee reveals prior disciplinary action 
short of dismissal, this can be taken into account when the employer decides on an 
appropriate sanction. The court makes a definitive statement by holding that ‗in general 
terms, the nature and extent of prior sanctions can legitimately form the basis of a 




The court in SA Transport held that: 
  
‗An exception applies when the employer considers an appropriate sanction for misconduct 
that is collective in nature. In this instance, prior disciplinary sanctions for individual 
misconduct cannot be used to justify a differentiation in penalty. The employer has no choice 





In Num and Another v Amcoal Colliery t/a Arnot Colliery and Another,
233
 the court held that:  
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‗The parity principle was designed to prevent unjustified selective punishment or dismissal 
and to ensure that like cases are treated alike. It was not intended to force an employer to mete 
out the same punishment to employees with different personal circumstances just because 
they are guilty of the same offence...a disciplinary record may justify differentiating between 
employees guilty of the same offence.‘
234
 
Zondo JP went on to state that the fact that the employer was entitled to take into account the 
employee‘s previous warnings is not in conflict with his judgment in SACTWU & others v 
Novel Spinners (Pty) Ltd.
235
 Zondo JP states: 
 
‗In that case it was argued that an employer is not entitled to take into account previous 
warnings which were in respect of individual misconduct when considering what sanction to 
impose in respect of collective action. In this case, the employee‘s  case, was that, by virtue of 
the fact that the conduct for which the previous warnings had been issued was not related to 
the conduct in respect of which the employer had to decide an appropriate sanction, the 
employer was not entitled to take such previous warnings into account. These are two 




What can be extracted from the above judgements is that firstly, inconsistency is an innate 
feature of the discretion awarded to employers in imposing sanction and secondly, employers 
will be justified in departing from consistently applying a particular sanction if there is a fair 
basis to do so. An example of a fair and objective basis for applying a different sanction is the 
employee‘s personal circumstances and more specifically his or her individual disciplinary 
record. Employers will not be compelled to impose the same sanction if they have legitimate 
grounds not to do so but they must keep in mind that a failure to consistently impose 
dismissal as a sanction for a particular misconduct, where they have done so in the past, may 
lead employees to believe that such misconduct is no longer considered serious enough to 
warrant dismissal.  
 
The disciplinary record is useful, regardless of whether the current and past misconduct are 
unrelated. What can be concluded is that is the disciplinary record of individual employees 
cannot be used where an employee is liable for participation in group misconduct. It becomes 
                                                          
234
 Para 19. 
235
 SACTWU and others v Novel Spinners (Pty) Ltd [1999] 11 BLLR 1157 (LC). 
236
 Para 24 & 25. 
58 
 
apparent once again, that if an employer is able to justify his actions, even if they are 
inconsistent, this remains his prerogative and the courts will not be able to intervene without 
legitimate countervailing reasons.  
 
The last point regarding consistency in the Guidelines states that ‗[a]n employer may justify a 
change in its approach to disciplining employees for particular misconduct by showing that 
employees were made aware of the change in the approach‘.
237
 This principle was enunciated 
by the court in Cape Town City Council,
238
 which held that: 
‗While it is true that an employer cannot be expected to continue repeating a wrong decision 
in obeisance to a principle of consistency...the proper course in such cases is to let it be 
known to employees clearly and in advance that the earlier application of disciplinary 
measures cannot be expected to be adhered to in the future.‘
239   
According to Van Niekerk this approach suggests that ‗excessively lenient treatment of one 
employee should not serve to advantage another employee.‘
240
 In summation all an employer 
needs to prove in order to justify any inconsistency in the imposition of sanction, is the 
presence of a fair and objective reason or evidence that employees were made aware that 
previous disciplinary sanctions will not be applied similarly in the future. 
In Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others,
241
 the court also touched upon 




‗A claim of inconsistency (in either historical or contemporaneous terms) must satisfy a 
subjective element – an inconsistency challenge will fail where the employer did not know 
of the misconduct allegedly committed by the employee used as a comparator...The 
objective element of the test to be applied is a comparator in the form of a similarly 
circumstanced employee subjected to different treatment, usually in the form of a 
disciplinary penalty less severe than that imposed on the claimant...Similarity of 
circumstance is the inevitably most controversial component of this test. An inconsistency 
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challenge will fail where the employer is able to differentiate between employees who have 
committed similar transgressions on the basis of, inter alia, differences in personal 




In a recent decision, the Labour Court in Nel v Transnet Bargaining Council and Others,
244
 
also considering the employer‘s justification for not imposing a sanction consistently, held 
that: 
‗The ratio of Irvin & Johnson, supra, indicates clearly that in considering whether or not the 
employer had applied the discipline inconsistently, one of the important factors to take into 
account is the gravity of the misconduct committed by the employee pleading inconsistency. 
The gravity of the offence, in the present instance, may even outweigh consideration of length 
of service of the affected employee. This will be so in particular when dealing with an 
employee who because of his seniority ought to know the impact that his or her conduct may 
have on the relationship between him and the employer and more importantly other 
stakeholders in the employer‘s business.‘
245
 
 In light of the fact that the courts have developed factors that may render an employer‘s 
conduct fair, despite its inconsistent characteristics; employees must evaluate all the 
circumstances before challenging a dismissal purely on the ground of inconsistency. As the 
court in Southern Sun
246
 adequately pointed out, ‗[i]t is evident from the above principles that 
there is no confusion in the jurisprudence as it relates to the consistency requirement, nor is 
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FACTORS THAT MAY JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT SANCTION 
 
The CCMA Guidelines list a number of reasons for not using dismissal as a sanction for an 
offence. The Guidelines state that ‗[a]lthough the following factors are often referred to as 
mitigating factors, this is misleading. Dismissal is not a punishment‘.
248
 Dismissal is a 
‗rational response to risk management‘.
249
 Thus ‗the factors that should be taken into account 
must be relevant to the risk of further instances of misconduct in the future, and the risk of 
harm to the enterprise as a result‘.
250
  
8.1. The Employee’s Circumstances 
8.1.1. Length of service 
According to Grogan, ‗it is widely accepted that the longer the period of service the employee 







 the court held that, ‗long service is no more than material from which an 




‗Long service does not lessen the gravity of the misconduct or serve to avoid the appropriate 
sanction for it... Long service is not as such mitigatory. Mitigation, as that term is understood 
in the criminal law, has no place in employment law. Dismissal is not an expression of moral 
outrage; much less is it an act of vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operational 
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It is the legal reasoning of the court in De Beers
255
 which introduced the concept of ‗rational 
response to risk‘
256
 into the Guidelines. It is noteworthy that the court looked not only at the 
gravity of the misconduct, which on the face of the situation would justify dismissal, but also 
the effect it has on the business of the employer. It is to be inferred that if the employer can 
no longer trust the employee it is no longer a viable option to continue the employment 
relationship and risk further business infractions. The reasoning of the court reinforces that a 
balanced approach to the determination of an appropriate sanction should fundamentally 
include consideration of the employer‘s business needs as well as the relationship of trust. 
 
It was also held by the court in De Beers that long service is ‗not entirely irrelevant‘.
257
 The 
court found that: 
 
‗It is relevant in determining whether an employee is likely to repeat his misdemeanour. An 
employee who has long and faithfully served his employer has shown that he has little 
propensity for offending.‖
258
 Depending on the circumstances, long service may be a weighty 
consideration. However the risk factor is paramount.
259
 Grogan submits that in light of the De 
Beers judgment, long service merely creates a prima facie impression of reliability, which can 




The court in Theewaterskloof Municipality
261
 held that long service: 
 
‗[D]oes not stand as a number of years in vacuo. Like any factor it must be evaluated in the 
circumstances of the case as a whole; it does not ipso facto trigger a reduction in the sanction 
or trump the other factors. In general, there are two aspects to long service. The one aspect is 
that an employee with lengthy service will have become imbued with a proper understanding 
of the rules, objects and values of his employer. That might be an appropriate circumstance to 
take into account at the stage of determining guilt. However, when it comes to sanction, the 
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Furthermore the court held that, ‗[w]hen it comes to sanction, long service can never as such 




In light of the above judgments it is suggestive that, long service will not be viewed as a 
significantly weighty factor in the overall enquiry into the appropriateness of the sanction 
especially where the employee‘s misconduct reflects an element of dishonesty, which has had 
the effect of damaging the relationship of trust. In Hulett
264
 the court held that: 
 
‗[T]he presence of dishonesty tilts the scales to an extent that even the strongest mitigating 
factors, like long service and a clean record of discipline are likely to have minimal impact on the 




In Transnet Rail Engineering Ltd v Transnet Bargaining Council and Others,
266
 the court 
pointed out that long service may have the effect of reducing the sanction to be imposed for 
misconduct but went further than most courts in the past have ventured by stating that long 
service may also necessitate a harsher sanction in certain circumstances.
267
 This dictum 
stands to be overturned by a higher court especially in light of the fact that the judgment does 
not list the type of circumstances that will result in long service increasing the severity of the 
sanction. 
 
8.1.2. Disciplinary Record 
Grogan suggests that ‗an employee‘s disciplinary record may be taken into account when 
considering whether the employee should be dismissed for a particular offence. This follows 
from the requirement that discipline should be ‗progressive‘ discipline.
268
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In Shoprite (Pty) Ltd v Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others
269
 
the court dealt with a case where an employee had been captured on the store video camera, 
on several occasions, eating in areas in which such conduct was prohibited. He was charged 
with misconduct and dismissed. The employee had 30 years of service and was a first 
offender.
270
 The judge stated: 
 
‗When all the relevant circumstances are taken into account, I am of the opinion that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not, in the circumstances of this case, have concluded that 
an employee who had a clean disciplinary record such as the fourth respondent and who had 
30 years of service should, in addition to getting a ―severe final warning‖ for this type of 




In MEC for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal & Another v Dorkin NO & Another,
272
 the employee‘s 
misconduct related to granting of bursaries in excess of authorised amounts. Zondo JP held 
that: 
‗ I have no hesitation in concluding that his is a decision that no reasonable person could 
reach on the facts of this case and his decision is not just unreasonable but it is, without any 
doubt, grossly unreasonable. The facts that the second respondent had 21 years of service and 
a clean record cannot mean that on the facts of this case, the sanction of dismissal would not 
be appropriate. There is a limit to which an employee‘s long service period and clean record 





 the court looked at the issue of the employee‘s 
disciplinary record throughout his 22 years of service.  The court held that: 
‗Although a value judgment must eventually be based on a holistic appraisal of all factors, 
this is a case in which a primary comparison can helpfully be drawn between the length of 
service and clean record on the one hand and the circumstances of the offence and lack of 
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remorse amounting to defiance on the other. The lens through which the product of this 




With various aggravating and mitigating factors to consider along with the various legal 
principles dealing with each factor, it is understandable that arbitrators and employers are 
unsure of the weight to attach to each factor. Although it has been mentioned that long 
service is always mitigatory it has also be asserted that in some instances long service will not 
be able to mitigate the seriousness of the offence committed by the employee. Furthermore 
there has even been a suggestion that long service may work against the favour of an 
employee who has been found guilty of breaching the relationship of trust.  Much depends on 
the circumstances of the case. In Theewaterskloof Municipality,
276
 the court‘s 
acknowledgement of the difficulty that may arise in weighing up different factors is to be 
applauded. In addition to this acknowledgement, the judgment provides an objective 






 the fact that the employee had a clean disciplinary record did not assist him in 
terms of sanction. The fact that the employee had not owned up to his wrongdoing and had 
invented a false defence rendered his conduct dishonest and had broken the relationship of 
trust despite the employee‘s lack of prior offences. However it is interesting that in this 
instance, the employees clean disciplinary record was used as evidence that counted against 
his defence of kleptomania. Molahlehi J held that: 
 
‗In my judgment, had the arbitrator appreciated the issue before him, he ought to have found 
that it would be unfair to expect the applicant to retain an employee, who when initially asked 
to be searched, resisted, and once found in possession of the copper he sought to blame 
someone else. He later seeks to suggest that he was entitled to remove the copper because it 
was scrap. Further, when he realised that his excuse is unsustainable as an afterthought, he 
resorted to concoct a defence in the form of kleptomania. It to be noted that there is no 
evidence that the respondent has in the many years that he has been employed by the 
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applicant ever been accused of theft. There is also no evidence that the respondent has ever 




8.1.3. Personal Circumstances 
 
The Guide does not provide any guidance regarding the factor of personal circumstances 
except to say that they must be work related. Grogan states that ‗there has been little attempt 
to explain which personal circumstances may be relevant, and how much weight should be 
accorded to them if any‘.
280
 He contends that it is ‗doubtful whether employees will be able 
to persuade judges or arbitrators that a dismissal that is otherwise fair is unfair solely because 
they are sole breadwinners or advanced in years... Excessive leniency on the basis of personal 




8.2. Nature of the Job 
 
The Guide recognises the nature of a job as a relevant factor in terms of a situation ‗whereby 
any further infraction makes the risk of continued employment intolerable‘.
282
 The job 
description of the employee and the position of trust that he is placed in, was briefly 
discussed under the subheading ‗Aggravating Factors‘.
283
 The issue of tolerability and risk 
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THE CONSIDERATION OF PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE WHEN IMPOSING 
SANCTION FOR MISCONDUCT 
 
 
As seen in the preceding chapter, the examination of an employee‘s disciplinary record will 
indicate whether progressive discipline may or may not be utilised.  Regarding the origin of 
the concept of progressive discipline, a research paper into progressive discipline in the 
Australian workplace, conducted by John Chelliah and Pitsis Tyrone, discusses this form of 




According to the paper, progressive discipline originated in the United States of America 
around the 1930‘s. It was a reaction to trade union demands that summary terminations by 
employers should be abolished and a progressive system of discipline be introduced. This 
was requested in the hope that this innovative system would prevent employees from losing 




To elaborate, the inception of progressive discipline was a reaction to the problem of 
dismissal of employees without being given adequate warning that their behaviour warranted 
dismissal and secondly that should their conduct not be rectified, dismissal would be 
justified. The introduction of this approach did not seek to take away any discretion from the 
employer to set his own workplace rules or standards but merely to ensure that dismissal, 
should it be warranted, be imposed with caution and proper communication. This caution is 
in line with the doctrine of fairness, which dictates that parties are made fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions.  
With regard to what progressive discipline actually entails, it is stated that: 
‗Progressive discipline is made up of a procedure that deals with the behaviour of an 
employee who does not meet the requirements of code of conduct set by the employer. This 
system is intended to assist an employee improve his or her work behaviour by giving him/her 
the necessary feedback and support to adjust to workplace requirements, rather than simply 
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face unemployment at the whim of an employer. Employers are generally expected to give 
their employees an opportunity to remedy their shortcomings in performance or conduct prior 
to termination. Failure to do so would place employers at risk of litigation of the terminations 




Progressive discipline goes further than simply communicating the consequences of 
misconduct in the workplace; constant appraisal of the employee‘s performance or conduct is 
required and the employer is obliged to apply his or her mind to the issue, communicate and 
provide the employee with the necessary tools required to remedy the situation. What this 
seems to imply is that employers themselves should possess the necessary training to problem 
solve and communicate efficiently in order to give effect to this type of discipline. 
The paper suggests that progressive denotes ‗incremental‘ discipline, in that the sanctions 
imposed for the misconduct become ‗progressively harsher if the employee fails to meet the 
expectations of the employer‘.
287
  
The fact that punishment becomes increasingly severe results in two things. The first is that 
employee is given ample time to acknowledge his wrongdoing and rectify it if possible.  
Secondly an employer is not obliged to continue to employ an employee who deliberately and 
repeatedly fails to meet its expectations.  
In South African law, the employer has a right to discipline employees and to compile its 
own disciplinary code. If an internal disciplinary code does not exist then the Code of Good 
Practice will constitute the minimum guidelines
288
 for discipline in the workplace.
289
  
Item 3 (2) of the Code states that ‗[e]fforts should be made to correct the employee‘s 
behaviour through a system of progressive or graduated disciplinary measures‘. It has been 
suggested that the concept of correct or progressive discipline ‗denotes that an employer 
should attempt to desist from resorting to dismissal as a first option‘.
290
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In terms of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals:
291
  
‗Formal Procedures do not have to be invoked every time a rule is broken or a standard is not 
met. Informal advice and correction is the best and most effective way for an employer to deal 
with minor violations of work discipline. Repeated misconduct will warrant warnings, which 
themselves may be graded according to degrees of severity. More serious infringements or 
repeated misconduct may call for a final warning, or other action short at dismissal. Dismissal 
should be reserved for cases of serious misconduct or repeated offences.‘
292
 
The CCMA Guidelines point out that the Code, in line with the concept of progressive 
discipline, ‗distinguishes between single acts of misconduct that may justify the sanction of 
dismissal and those that may do so cumulatively‘.
293
 The guidelines furthermore identify the 
types of misconduct that the Code has deemed serious misconduct (for example sexual 
harassment) and which ‗may justify dismissal as a result of a single contravention‘.
294
   
The relevance of ‗progressive discipline‘ is highlighted in Sidumo
295
 in which the 
Constitutional Court held that ‗the absence of dishonesty is a significant factor in favour of 
the application of progressive discipline rather than dismissal. So too, is the fact that no 
losses were suffered‘.
296
 The court proceeded to state that, in light of these factors, ‗there was 
no indication that the principle of progressive discipline will not assist to adjust the 
employee‘s attitude and efficiency [emphasis added]‘.
297
 It is thus to be inferred that the aim 
of progressive discipline is to correct a flaw, deficiency or error on the part of the employee‘s 
outlook and performance in the workplace. 
The court in Theewaterskloof Municipality
298
 held that: 
‗[P]rogressive discipline is premised on a corrective purpose and outcome. If no correction is 
likely to be obtained or if the employment relationship is in any event irretrievably broken 
down, the scope for graduated discipline will likewise fall away. The facts of a particular case 
will indicate whether or not it should be applied.‘
299
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The application of progressive discipline will be determined on a case by case basis, with the 
court considering whether the damaged relationship of trust can be repaired. Thus the 
possibility that the relationship of trust can be mended is a precondition for the application of 
progressive discipline. The court in Theeswaterkloof Municipality
300
 further held that: 
‗Where an employee refuses to demonstrate any acceptance of wrongdoing, indicates no 
degree whatsoever of remorse, makes no move to correct what he has done and stands firm 
with an attitude of opposition towards the employer, then such an employee through his own 
conduct undercuts the applicability of corrective or progressive discipline.‘
301
 
The Labour Court, in considering the reasoning of the commissioner in Cash Paymaster 
Services Northwest (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others,
302
 found that it was clear that the employee 
should have been made aware of all the consequences that pertained to his conduct. The court 
noted that: 
‗As correctly submitted by Mr Grudlingh, in this instance the applicant was untruthful in 
handing in an assignment, which related to a training programme organized by the 
respondent. He should have been put on terms and advised of the consequences of his not 
fulfilling the training modules designed for his advancement. It is unfortunate that this was 




To impose a drastic sanction of dismissal, without the employee having ever known that 
dismissal was in fact a possibility, goes against the concept of progressive discipline.  Where 
an employee, although found guilty of misconduct, has the potential to be rehabilitated, the 
introduction of progressive discipline within our law and the concept of fairness dictate that 
he or she be given a second chance. In addition, in light of the harsh consequences of 
dismissal, the fact that the relationship of trust has not been completely severed must be taken 
into account when an employer or arbitrator contemplates dismissal as a sanction. 
The court in Timothy
304
 embraced a stricter approach to the application of progressive 
discipline in the face of flagrant dishonesty. It was held that: 
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‗The decision-maker who has to decide whether an arbitration or court must be cautious, 
before simply assuming that disciplinary sanctions must always and invariably be based on a 
progressive system. In other words, in a case such as the present, where there is an egregious 
act of dishonesty, and I use that word advisably because, as I have already indicated 
appellant‘s conduct throughout this dispute constituted a perpetuation of the dishonesty, by 
way of a denial, conversely complete a lack of acknowledgement of any wrongdoing, there is 
a formidable obstacle in the way of the implementation of a progressive sanction.‘
305
 
The court goes on to state that: 
‗Progressive sanctions were designed to bring the employee back into the fold, so as to 
ensure, by virtue of the particular sanction, that faced with the same situation again, an 
employee would resist the commission of the wrongdoing upon which act the sanction was 
imposed. The idea of a progressive sanction is to ensure that an employee can be reintegrated 
into the embrace of the employer‘s organisation, in circumstances where the employment 
relationship can be restored to that which pertained prior to the misconduct. In these 
circumstances, where there is nothing more than an aggressive denial and a perpetuation of 
dishonesty, it is extremely difficult to justify a progressive sanction...‘
306
 
The court points out that not every case will allow for progressive discipline to be imposed, 
especially where there is a lack of remorse or dishonesty. The only reason why these factors 
are important is that, firstly it is a strong indication of whether the relationship of trust has 
been breached and secondly progressive discipline can only be applied if there is possibility 
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TOLERABILITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST 
 
This chapter seeks to elaborate on the impact of misconduct on the ‗relationship of trust‘, not 
in isolation but in the acknowledgment that it relates to all the factors the commissioner is 
obliged to take into consideration when determining the fairness of sanction.  
According to item 3 (4) of the Code of Good Practice, ‗gross dishonesty‘ is listed as an 
example of serious misconduct which may warrant dismissal. The dismissal may be rendered 




The CCMA Guidelines also refer to the issue of tolerability in considering the nature of the 
employee‘s job, specifically with regard to whether ‗further infractions‘
308
 by the employee 
may be too great a risk for the employer to take in the circumstances. 
Dishonesty may ‗manifest‘
309
 itself in various ways; it may take the form of theft, fraud or 
non-disclosure. That gross dishonesty is generally accepted as warranting dismissal does not 
obviate the need to establish the appropriateness of sanction in each case, general 
assumptions will not suffice. There are various factors that the courts take into account when 
dealing with instances of dishonesty in an employment relationship. It is thus necessary to re-
examine how the courts have addressed the issue of dishonesty in the past.  
In Central News Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and 
Another,
310
 the employee had stolen five films valued at R50, 00 in total from the employer. 
De Klerk J held that: 
 
‗Appellant terminated its contractual relationship with second respondent as it was entitled to 
do because of the breach by second respondent of a basic tacit term of the contract of 
employment, i.e. that the employee would not steal from the employer and that the employee 
would not breach the position of trust in which he had been placed by being allowed into 
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appellant's store room. In my view it is axiomatic to the relationship between employer and 
employee that the employer should be entitled to rely upon the employee not to steal from the 
employer. This trust which the employer places in the employee is basic to and forms the 
substratum of the relationship between them. A breach of this duty goes to the root of the 




What can be gathered from this judgment is that theft, and inherent dishonesty associated 
with theft, are entirely destructive of the relationship of trust. Consequently once the basis of 
the relationship has been severely damaged then dismissal will be justified.  
 
In Anglo American farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant,
312
 the employee was accused of the 
‗misappropriation‘ of a can of Fanta. The court in dealing with the substantive fairness of the 
matter held that: 
 
‗[T]he relationship between the employer and the employee is of such a nature that, for it to 
be healthy, the employer must, of necessity, be confident that he can trust the employee not to 
steal his stock. If that confidence is destroyed or substantially diminished by the realization 
that the employee is a thief, the continuation of their relationship can be expected to become 
intolerable, at least for the employer... [T]he correct test to apply in the circumstances of theft 
is whether or not the employee‘s actions had the effect of rendering the continuation of the 




It is therefore not the act of theft itself that renders the relationship intolerable but the effect it 
has in damaging the relationship of trust. Therefore all acts of misconduct that are likely to 
have the same effect on the relationship of trust will in the same way justify dismissal. 
 
Almost a decade later, the approach of the current Labour Appeal Court seemed to be 
consistent with the above approach. In Toyota SA Motors
314
 the court specifically considered 
gross dishonesty and mitigating factors. Zondo AJP held that: 
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 ‗Although a long period of service will usually be a mitigating factor where an employee is 
guilty of misconduct; there are certain acts of misconduct which are of such serious nature 
that no length of service can save the guilty employee from dismissal. One such form of 




The judge went on to state that: 
 
‗I am not saying that there can be no sufficient mitigating factors in cases of dishonesty nor 
am I saying that dismissal is always an appropriate sanction for misconduct involving 
dishonesty. In my judgment the moment dishonesty is accepted in a particular case as being 







 Conradie JA dealt with the relationship of trust and stated that: 
 
 ‗Where an employee has committed a serious fraud, one might reasonably conclude that the 
relationship of trust between him or her and the employer has been destroyed. When the 
employer then asserts that this has in fact happened, it would be startling to hear a 
commissioner proclaim that, despite what one might expect and despite what the employer 
says in fact occurred, the relationship of trust had not been broken down. Of course, a 
commissioner is not bound to agree with an employer‘s assessment of damage done to the 
relationship of trust between it and the delinquent but in the case of serious fraud, only 




What becomes a decisive factor is the employers claim that the relationship of trust has 
indeed been irreparably harmed. There are instances in which an employee may commit a 
serious act of dishonesty yet the employer may still feel it is capable of trusting that 
employee. The employer‘s appraisal of the situation must be taken into consideration. 
Therefore the presence of dishonesty in itself is not enough to suggest the relationship of trust 
has completely disintegrated. 
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 The court in De Beers
319
 found that: 
 
‗The seriousness of dishonesty – i.e. whether it can be stigmatised as gross or not, depends 
not only on the act of dishonesty itself but the way in which it impacts on the employer‘s 
business. The employees in casu were not dismissed in order to punish them. They were 
dismissed because the employer was not prepared to run the risk of employing them any 
longer once they had been shown to be dishonest. Long service, is of course, not entirely 
irrelevant in determining whether an employee is likely to repeat his misdemeanour... [b]ut 




Therefore another element that must be considered is the effect of the offence on the 
employers business. The greater the damage, the more likely the act of dishonesty can be 
characterized as gross. This is an objective enquiry that requires the arbitrator or the 
employer to objectively assess any existing damage or the potential consequences of that 




 ‗there is a high premium placed on honesty because conduct that 
involves corruption by the employees damages the trust relationship which underpins the 
essence of the employment relationship‘.
322
 A similar approach is evident in Standard Bank 
of SA v CCMA and Others
323
  where it was held that: 
  
‗It is one of the fundamentals of the employment relationship that an employer should be able 
to place trust in an employee. A breach of this trust in the form of conduct involving 
dishonesty is one that goes to the heart of the relationship and is destructive of it. 
The existence of the duty upon an employee to act with good faith towards his or her 
employer and to serve honestly and faithfully is one of long standing in the common law. It 
has been regularly and strongly approved by our courts in relation to the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction under the previous Act 28 of 1956. It has been no less strongly re-affirmed in 
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In Hoch v Mustek Electronics (Pty) Ltd
325
 the court held that: 
 
‗It is for the employer to set standards of conduct for its employees. As long as these 
standards are reasonable the court will not interfere (see the requirements of item 7 of 
schedule 8 to the Act). It is also the prerogative of the employer to decide on a proper 
sanction once these standards have been transgressed. This is especially so when there is a 





The court found it necessary to set dishonesty apart from other forms of misconduct. In 
addition the court pointed out that because the employment relationship is a personal one, it is 
for the employer to consider the consequence of the breach of such trust.  
 
In Mutual Construction Co Tvl (Pty) Ltd
327
 the court approached the employee‘s misconduct 
by considering the ‗totality of the circumstances‘.
328
  The court, in taking into account the 
employee‘s position of trust, found that ‗this role played by the third respondent constituted a 




Furthermore the court found that the misconduct involved ‗gross dishonesty and fraud which 
was bound to cause harm and prejudice to the appellant's business operation‘.
330
  In 
summation the court held that to continue to employ the employee ‗would have been severely 
detrimental to the appellant's operational requirements and therefore inappropriate‘;
331
 and 





It is apparent that the ‗relationship of trust‘ is viewed through the prism of the employer‘s 
operational requirements. Thus if the employers operational requirements justify a dismissal 
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it would at the same time mean that the prospect of the continuation of the employment 
relationship has been compromised. 
In  Miyambo v CCMA & Others
333
 the court found it necessary to ‗reflect on the role that trust 
plays in the employment relationship‘.
334
  The court found that the risk that an enterprise 
undertakes is dependent on its ability to trust its employees.
335
 Thus ‗accumulation of 




The decision of Transnet
337
is significant in that it illustrates the potential for commissioners 
to sometimes confuse the issues to be dealt with in determining the appropriateness of 
sanction. Whereas the commissioner ought to focus on the effect of dishonesty on the 
relationship of trust, the commissioner in this instance focused on the non-problematic 




‗In relation to the issue of the breakdown of trust, the arbitrator misconceived this issue. The 
facts before him had very little to do with the working relationship between the respondent 
and his supervisor. The issue before the arbitrator concerned the dishonest conduct of the 
respondent. Because of misconceiving the issue, the Commissioner failed to appreciate that 




The significance of the impact of misconduct on the relationship of trust was highlighted in 
the discussion of aggravating and mitigating factors, it became relevant in considering the 
reasons why an employer should desist from imposing dismissal and it became central when 
dealing with when to apply progressive discipline. As has been argued in preceding chapters, 
the consideration of the relationship of trust could afford the employee protection from an 
employer who simply contends that it is the interest of his business to dismiss the employee.  
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In assessing the impact of misconduct on the relationship of trust, employers and 
commissioners must consider the personal circumstances of the employee, his length of 
service and the presence of remorse; if all of these considerations point to the fact that the 
relationship of trust has not irreparably broken down then dismissal may not be appropriate. 
On the other hand, if the employer contends that the relationship of trust has broken down 
and in light of his operational requirements, he cannot afford the risk of continuing to employ 
the offending employee; the employer must prove the breakdown in the relationship of trust 
in order for the dismissal to be upheld. 
In Edcon Ltd v Pillemer and Others
340
 the dismissal was alleged to have been based in the 
fact that the employee‘s dishonesty had destroyed the relationship of trust. At the CCMA, the 
commissioner found that ‗for a decision to dismiss an employee such as Reddy with track 
record of 43 years unblemished employment the misconduct had to be gross and evidence 
was necessary to show that the relationship of trust had in fact been destroyed‘.
341
 The 
commissioner found that no direct evidence was led by Edcon to show that the relationship of 
trust had broken down. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal court found that the determinant issue is whether the trust 
relationship between Edcon and Reddy had been shown in arbitration to have been destroyed. 
It was held that in determining the reasonableness of an award, courts have to make a value 
judgment as to whether the commissioner‘s conclusion is rationally connected to the reasons 
for this conclusion taking into account the material before the commissioner. That is the 
correct approach endorsed in the Sidumo
342
 Constitutional Court judgement. Therefore the 
court held that Pillemer‘s finding that Edcon had led no evidence showing the alleged 
breakdown in the trust relationship cannot be criticized. Her conclusion is rationally 




Thus a ‗balanced approach‘ would incorporate a two prong test; the first leg of the test 
dealing with the relationship of trust and the employee‘s subjective circumstances; the second 
leg of the test would consider the employee subjective circumstances in light of the 
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employer‘s objective business needs. If the employer can prove the breakdown in trust on 
objective grounds, then case law reveals that the commissioner ought not to override the 
employer‘s decision to dismiss. Hence in applying a balanced approach that deals with the 
competing interests of the employee and the employee, the scope of the commissioner to 
exceed his authority is limited to the factual, legal and objective test that cannot be easily 
undermined by his ‗own sense of fairness‘. The inherent objective features of such a test will 











































According to the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, ‗[A]ny person determining whether a 
dismissal is unfair should consider whether the dismissal is an appropriate sanction‘.
344
  
There are two considerations that apply when contemplating the above enquiry: firstly, the 
Code of Good Practice does not attract the weight of law and secondly, the concept of 
‗appropriateness‘ is so varying that it may attract a myriad of interpretations.  
In terms of the ‗deferential approach‘ developed by South African courts,
345
 employees could 
be ‗fairly dismissed‘ insofar as a commissioner deemed the decision to fall within a ‗range of 
reasonable options‘ available to the ‗reasonable employer‘. The employer‘s right to dismiss 
was consequently beyond impeachment as long as it did not amount to unreasonableness. 
In light of the new constitutional dispensation, which echoes the fundamental right to fair 
labour practices, the ‗deferential approach‘ which failed to take into account the employees 
perspective falls short of the Constitutional directive of fair labour practices for both the 




 the ‗deferential approach‘ was replaced by the 
‗reasonable commissioner‘ test which considers the matter exclusively through the viewpoint 
of a reasonable commissioner‘s sense of fairness. Whilst the demise of the ‗deferential 
approach‘ is to be hailed, there seems to be inherent shortcomings evident in the ‗reasonable 
commissioner‘ test as well. 
The authority bestowed upon the commissioner to determine the fairness of the sanction 
according to his ‗own sense of fairness‘ and ‗value judgment‘, may lead to a deferential 
approach towards the commissioner‘s perspective on the matter. Whilst the courts have 
extrapolated factors to be considered and balanced by the commissioner in determining the 
fairness of a sanction; the fact that the ultimate decision is based solely on the 
commissioner‘s subjective sense of fairness may potentially undermine the entire enquiry. 
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Many courts have acknowledged the inconsistency and uncertainty that may arise from such 
an approach but have dismissed it under the guise of ‗legislative intention‘.   
The legislature and the judiciary have listed the factors that must be considered by the 
commissioner in his capacity to determine the fairness of sanction; some of these factors have 
been codified in the recently handed down CCMA Guidelines. Many of these factors tie in 
with the ‗relationship of trust‘ which our courts have repeatedly identified as being the 
pinnacle of the employment relationship. In addition the courts, against the backdrop of the 
Sidumo
348
 judgment, have identified the employers ‗operational requirements‘ as a necessary 
and objective factor to be taken into account when determining the fairness of sanction.  Thus 
the operational requirements and the relationship of trust are crucial factors to be considered 
when adopting a ‗balanced approach‘ to the competing interests of the employer and 
employee. 
The balancing of the countervailing interests of the employer and employee can be conducted 
in light of two crucial issues: the employer‘s objective operational requirements and the 
subjective circumstances of the contravention that may or may not have the effect of 
repairing the damaged relationship of trust. 
The ‗balanced approach‘ would not require the commissioner‘s value judgment to be used 
without constraint but would confine the enquiry to whether the employer can operationally 
afford to retain an offending employee. If not, the employer would still have to prove, in 
addition, that the relationship of trust cannot be repaired. In considering whether the 
relationship of trust has been destroyed, the commissioner must consider the subjective 
circumstances such as aggravating and mitigating factors; it is in this regard that a 
commissioner may pronounce on the fairness of the dismissal, based exclusively on the facts 
and evidence before him. 
In conclusion it is trite that the ‗reasonable employer‘ test applied in the United Kingdom is 
excessively deferential to the employer‘s perspective on the appropriateness of sanction. The 
‗deferential approach‘ adopted in South Africa, which advocated a ‗band of reasonableness‘, 
was not as excessively deferential as the English approach nevertheless it failed to strike a 
balance between the interests of the employer and employee. Finally the ‗reasonable 
commissioner‘ test, as developed by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo, advocates the 
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consideration of both the employee and the employer‘s conflicting interests, nonetheless it 
provides for potential abuse by commissioners interpreting their authority and role according 
to their ‗own sense of fairness‘; and could possibly lead to an excessively deferential 
approach towards the decisions of commissioners. Therefore regard must be had to this 
potential for abuse as well as the limited powers of the courts to review arbitration awards.  In 
doing so, a balanced approach ought to limit the power of commissioners to determine the 
appropriateness of sanction according to their own perception of fairness and rather oblige 
commissioners to consider the concept of fairness in light of the interests of both the 
employer and the employee in the specific circumstances. 
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